Brendan Balcerak Jackson

Philosophisches Seminar
Emmy Noether Group
Universität zu Köln
Richard-Strauss-Strasse 2
50931 Köln / Germany
Office: Room 2.B03
Tel. +49 221-470 1237
E-mail: bbalcerakjackson (at) gmail.com
I am one of the co-leaders of the Emmy Noether Research Group “Understanding and the A Priori” at the University of Cologne in Germany. I did my undergraduate study at Lawrence University in Wisconsin, and I got my PhD from Cornell University in New York. While finishing my degree I worked as a lecturer at the University of Colorado, Boulder, and afterwards I worked as a research fellow at the Centre for Consciousness at the Australian National University. I then worked as an assistant professor at the University of California, Davis for two years. I then returned to the Australian National University for another short stint as a research fellow, prior to moving to Cologne to be part of the Emmy Noether Project.
I am also the editor for the Logical Form category on PhilPapers.
Research
My main areas of research are the philosophy of language and metaphysics, and I also have interests in epistemology, the philosophy of mind, philosophical logic and the history of analytic philosophy.
Some of my current research in the philosophy of language focuses on compositional semantic structure. I am especially interested in the relationship between semantic structure and lexical meaning, and on what a proper account of semantic structure can tell us about the nature of linguistic understanding. I also think that reflection on semantic structure sheds new light on the debate over the analytic/synthetic distinction.
My current research in metaphysics primarily concerns issues in meta-ontology and meta-metaphysics more generally. I am especially interested in attempts to deflate metaphysics, e.g. by characterizing ontological claims as useful fictions, or by describing metaphysical debates as merely verbal disputes. I am also interested in whether (and which sorts of) metaphysical truths can be regarded as conceptual or analytic truths.
More generally, I am among those philosophers who think that the search for substantial analytic or conceptual truths, conducted from the armchair and relying solely on understanding and reflection, is a core part of the philosophical enterprise. Much of my recent work is concerned, directly or indirectly, with articulating and defending this meta-philosophical view.
